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DOMINANCE IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES INDUSTRY
- P. S. Giridharan
Department of Information Systems and Computer Science
National University of Singapore
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the telecommunications services market. This is a fast-expanding market, with Microsoft's
announced entry into it providing additional impetus, and raising policy issues. We look for the market structure
that will arise from the decisions of the service providers (in terms of product characteristics and pricing) and the
customers, all acting in their own interests. We derive sufficient conditions for restricting the number of possible
outcomes to three out of several potential ones. These conditions are satisfied by the common assumptions. We
2Asoshow&atwhen positive externalities aredominant, we willhave only market-comeringatequilibrium. This
result holds even when the products are d0erentiared. (We are already seeing near-complete market-cornering
in the similar market for operating systems). 77,at does not deter any oftheconipemorsfromentering thefray
in the./irst place, since aU have positive expected profits. We derive the probability that each will be the player
tocorner themBrket. We also show the non-intuitive result that when externatities are dominant, the providers
do not have to wony about extemalities at all in taking their decisions. We have also introduced a new solution
concept called "odds of dominance" in analyzing our game.
1. INTRODUCTION product (Other markets such as those for operating systems also
exhibit demand externalities.)
Telecommunications is 'baching out and touching"huge chunks
ofboth residential and commercial markets. For example, the Another relevant characteristic of this market is the increasing
announcement ofMicrosoft recently to enter the on-line services technological ability to interconnect across different networks.
market with its Microsoft Network product is expected by many
to be a watershed event in on-line services. The trend toward An important strategy of the service providers is to differentiate
integration has led to an explosive growth in public communica- their products.' Product differentiation is important to users also
tions technologies and services such as on-line services, packet- since they may potentially get to choose from different o fferings.
switching, EDI, and electronic mail on a global scale. In In this paper, we analyze this important strategy of differentiation
particular, Microsoft's announced product, the Microsoft Network (and the related pricing strategy) and the resultant impact on the
has raised the concern of both its competitors as well as regula- industry.
tors. (SeePauker 1990; Crockett 1991; Dowling and Witte 1991 ;
Pentland 1992; Wilsher and Shetty 1993; Draper 1994; Elmer- 'I'he existing work on differentiation does not take into account -
Dewitt 1995.) the specific characteristics of the telecommunications markets,
namely
In this study, we look for the market structure that will arise from
the decisions of the service providers (in terms of product (i) network exter!;alities; and
characteristics and pricing) and the customers, all acting in their
own interests. We show that the namre Of the product & such (ii) network interconnection
that a monopoly outcome is the likely one.
We consider these characteristics and derive results peculiar to
The chief characteristic of the market that we are considering is this market.
a highly distributed and inter-dependent demand structure, that
is, this market exemplifies those with "demand externalities." We adopt the modeling paradigm of spatial competition, as
Demand externalities are said to arise when the demand for a Hotelling (1929) and d'Aspremont, Gabsewicz and Thisse
product is a function of the number of other adopters of the (1979). (See Giridharan (1993) for an extensive list.)
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We adopt a non-cooperative game theoretic model and One of the ends of the line is taken to be the origin for purposes
of measurement. 'I'he two competitors locate their products
(i) derive sufficient conditions for there being at most three (denoted by 1 and 2) at a, alid 02 respectively, with q s 4.
equilibrium outcomes out ofseveral possible ones and show (Clearly, if a, = ,4, the products are undifferentiated and the
that the usual modeling assumptions satisfy the sufficient coinpetiuon is only on the basis of price. Hence, to capture the
conditions mentioned above; effect of differentiation, we have a, < a,) They charge prices p,
and P2 respectively for their products. We refer to the disutility
(ii) demonstrate that when externalities are not dominant, there cost of not choosing the ideal product by d(y), where "f' is the
may be market-splitting or market-comering; however, when distance of the ideal product from the chosen product. Thus the
externalities are dominant, at equilibrium there will be a effective price that a customer pays for product i that is located
single provider, (i.e., there will be market-cornering); at a "distance" y from her ideal product is p, + d(y). The cost
function d(.) is increasing and convex. Each customer chooses
(iii) show that, when externalities aredominant, although there the product with the higher net value for herself.
will be niarket-cornering at equilibrium, each competitor has
a non-zero probability of cornering the market as the game In the first stage of the game, the competitors decide simulta-
is being played out and derive the probability of each neously on the characteristics for their products, i.e., they choose
competitor cornering the market; the "locations." In the second stage they decide on the prices
simultaneously. In the third stage, the customers make their
(iv) show that when extemalities are dominant the competitors choice simultaneously.
actually do not have to consider the externalities at all in
setting the product characteristics and prices; and 3. ANALYSIS
(v) introduce a new solution concept called odds ofdominance We start our analysis from the last stage.
in analyzing the game.
3.1 Customer Choice Stage
We present the model in section 2, the analysis in section 3 and
summarize the paper in section 4. When the customers make their choice, they do not know how
many other adopters of the product there will be. We use a
2. THE MODEL "fulfilled expectations" model to describe their behavior. The
customers have an expectation about the size of the customer base
The utility that a customer derives from a particular offering is for each product, and in equilibrium, their expectation comes true.
an increasing and concave function of the number of adopters of This model has been used, for example, in Katz and Shapiro
that offering. Hence, this model maybe readily adapted to other (1985) and Economides (1992).
products where there are network externalities„ suchas operating
systems. Our model can be used to analyze differentiation We define some useful terms. All the customers in the region
between Windows 95 and OS/2. (See, for example, Cortese 10,a,) are said to be in the backyard of product 1; and similarly,
1994; Darrow 1994; Petreley 1994). We also model the ability all the customers in (ap t] are in the backyard of product 2.
of networks to connect to each other.
A market-cornering equilibrium is said to arise when, in
The ideal products of the customers are located uniformly along equilibrium, either of the products captures the entire market;
a line of length 1. There are two competitors each offering a otherwise a market-splitting equilibrium is said to arise.
differentiated product Theycan choose any set of characteristics
for their products (i.e., they can locate their products anywhere If, in a market-splitting equilibrium, the inhabitants of either of
along the line). Each customer chooses exactly one of the two the backyards are split between the two products, then it is said
competing products. In general, if there arcx adopters for a given to be a backyard equilibrium; otherwise, the market-splitting
product (and hence (1 - x) adopters for the other product), then equilibrium is an internal equilibrium.
the utility U for the adopters of that product is given by
Consider the behavior ofcustomers, given the product "locations"
U(x)=u+J[x+IL(l-x)).0 sk<1, (i.e., the product characteristics) and prices. Let the expected
market sizes of products 1 and 2 respectively be e, and ez (= (l -
where u is the baseline utility, and./ .) is the externality function e,)). With such given values for al, ap Pa, P; and ei, the custom-
that is increasing and concave and k is the cross-connectivity ers make their choice. We show below in Lemma 1 that we can
factor: always find a cut-off point, called a transition point, denoted by
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1(ap ap P,· Pi, e,) such that all customers located in [O. tfat. a2. partycan be better off by setting an off-equilibrium price, given
pi, p> e,)) will prefer one of the two products (say, 1) over the that its competitor sets the equilibrium price.
other; and all the customers located in (tfai. a, P,P, e,J. 4 will
prefer the other product (which is 2 in this case), with at least one We first consider is the possibility of multiple equilibria (at stage
of the two groups having a strong preference. 3) as a result of certain price combinations set during stage 2.
The key question is as to which of these possible outcomes the
Lemma 1: There always exists a transition point t(ap appt, service-providers should reckon while setting their prices.
P> eb.
We introduce a solution concept that we call odds ofdominance.
Proof: Available in the full paper. If, for any given set of product characteristics and prices, there
are multiple equilibria possible, it is reasonable to expect that
We look for a fulfilled expectations equilibrium, where r(at. ap those equilibria which are not preferred by many customers are
p„ p;, e,) = ei. Obviously, for any given level of expectation, less likely to occur than those that are preferred by many
there can be at most one fulfilled expectation equilibrium (i.e., customers. In particular, when there are multiple equilibria
the expectation either comes true or it does not). However, possible, we model the probability of each of those potential
different expectations can, in general, lead to multiple equilibria. equilibria being the actual equilibrium as equal to the proportion
We now show sufficient conditions for there being at most one of customers preferring that equilibrium over the others.
interior equilibrium. In particular, we show that when./r.) and
d(.) are linear functions, these conditions are satisfied. We further Next, the relative strength of the externality factor (with respect
show that when d(.) is linear, then there cannot be any backyard to how strongly customers want their "ideal" products) plays an
equilibrium Thus, under linearityoff and d there can be at most important role :in .the analysis. Clearly, G is a measure of the
three equilibria (two market-comering equilibria and one interior externality factor and D is a measure of the preference for the
equilibrium). ideal product (i.e., the greater the value of D, the greater is the
disutility in moving from the ideal product).
Theorem 1: When d'(O) 2 (1 - ky'(0) or d'(1) 5 (1 - k*'(0,
then there is at most one internal equilibrium. Specifically, we say that the externality (preference, respectively)
effect is dominant if D < (>, respectively)
Proof: Available in the full paper. G. (mi '2,1 - a,}
We note that iff and d are linear, both of the conditions in the
(a2 - al)
above theorem are satisfied. We then go on to assume.#.) and
d(.) to be linear (with F and D denoting the constants of propor-
tionality respectively). For notational convenience, we denote Note that the factor
(1 -k). FbyG. The linearity of the extemality function and the (mi*:, 1 - a,}
transportation cost is standard in much of the respective literature
(a2 - al)on externalities and differentiation.
In Lemma 2, we further restrict the number ofpossible equilibria.
is greater than or equal to 1,
Lemma 2: Under linearity ofd, there cannot be any backyard
equilibria. We are primarily interested in the case where externalitie
s are
dominant. However, for ease of exposition, we consider both
Proof: Available in the full paper.
preference-doininance and externality-dominance.
Thus, given the product prices and their characteristics, there can Theorem 2: When the preference effect is dominant, there may
be at most three possible fulfilled expectations equilibria (two be market-cornering or market-splitting. However, when the
market-cornering ones and one interior one). We next consider externalityeffect is dominant, there will only be market-comering.
which of these three potential cases will actually be realized.
Proof: Available in the full paper.
3.2 Choice of Prices As part of the proof of thwrem 2, we show that under extemality-
dominance, under certain price-combinations, market cornering
The competitors choose the prices so as to maximize their byprovider 1 is assured; under certain other price-combinations,respective profits. We look for an equilibrium where neither cornering by provider 2; and under all other price-combinations,
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either one maybe the provider to corner the market. Rationality even if the products are differentiated. The intuition here is that,
dictates that, for any given price by the competitor j, provider i if the externality effect is strong enough, then it will swamp any
will not choose a price that will shut himself out of the market for possible advantage from differentiation. (We are already seeing
sure. Hence, we have the following corollary: near-complete market dominance in the operating systems market,
which has similar characteristics.)
Corollary: Under externalitrdominance, even though there will
be only one player at equilibrium, each player has a non-zero However, this expected market-dominance does not deter any of
probability of being that dominant player as the game is being the competitors from entering the Bay in the first place, since both
played out (i.e., during the first two stages). have positive expected profits. This may explain why several
entrants are seen in the field. We derive the probability that each
We derive in Lemma 3 the probability of each player being the will be the player to corner the market.
one to corner the market:
We also show the non-intuitive result that, when externalities are
Lemma 3: When the externality effect is dominant, the dominant, the providers do not have to worry about externalities
probability that provider i corners the market is at all in makiIig their decisions. This has an important managerial
given by implication. If this result is not true, then managers have to factor
externalities into their decision making. This is normally a very
Pt - P,  a2 -at, forj # i. difficult task. However, our model shows that they do not have
2•1•D 2.1 to do it.
We have also introduced a new solution concept called "odds of
Proof: Available in the full paper. dominance" in analyzing our game.
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